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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Mack Lloyd Snider appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for 
appointed counsel and summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In his underlying criminal case, Snider was found guilty, after a jury trial, of possession 
of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver.  (R., pp.4-5; Aug., p.1.1)  He was sentenced to a 
unified term of 13 years with three years fixed.  (Id.)  He appealed, and his judgment and 
sentence were affirmed by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion on January 27, 2016.  
See State v. Snider, Docket No. 42943, 2016 Unpublished Op. No. 349 (Idaho App., January 27, 
2016).   
On January 11, 2017, Snider filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he raised 
several conclusory claims of error.  (R., pp.4-7.)  It also appears that he filed a motion for 
appointment of post-conviction counsel.  (See Aug., p.1.)  Determining that the petition was 
frivolous, the district court denied the appointment of counsel and filed a notice of intent to 
dismiss the petition on the basis that Snider had failed to present any evidence in support of his 
unsubstantiated claims.  (Aug., pp.1-9.)  After receiving a response from Snider (Aug., pp.10-
26), the district court summarily dismissed Snider’s petition (R., pp.13-16).  Snider filed a timely 
notice of appeal.  (R., pp.18-21.) 
 
                                            
1  Contemporaneous with the filing of this brief, the state has filed a motion requesting that this 
Court augment the appellate record with the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss and 
Snider’s response to that notice. 
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ISSUE 
Snider lists the issues presented on appeal on page 5 of his Appellant’s brief.  The state 
consolidates and rephrases the issue as: 
 Has Snider failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
his motion to appoint post-conviction counsel to pursue his frivolous petition, or erred when it 
dismissed that petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
Snider Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied His 
Motion To Appoint Post-Conviction Counsel And Erred When It Summarily Dismissed His 
Frivolous Petition 
 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Snider’s motion for appointed counsel and summarily dismissed 
his petition for post-conviction relief because he failed to allege facts showing the possibility of a 
valid post-conviction claim and his petition was subject to summary dismissal.  (See Aug., pp.3-
9.)  On appeal, Snider contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request 
for counsel, and erred when it summarily dismissed his petition.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.)  
Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this case, however, demonstrates that 
Snider failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim.  The district court, therefore, properly 
denied his motion for appointed counsel and dismissed his frivolous post-conviction petition.  
The district court should be affirmed. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is governed by 
Idaho Code § 19-4904.  “The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies 
within the discretion of the district court.”  Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 
1108, 1111 (2004); see also Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 683, 214 P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 
2009).  In reviewing the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings, “[t]his Court will not set aside the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  As to questions of law, this Court exercises free review.”  Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111 (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 
(2001)). 
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“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary 
hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, 
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file ….”  Workman v. State, 144 
Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 
P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
 
C. The District Court Properly Denied Snider’s Request For Counsel And Dismissed His 
Petition Because Snider Failed To Raise The Possibility Of A Valid Claim 
 
There is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings.  Pennsylvania 
v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).  While a district court may, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-
4904, appoint counsel for an indigent post-conviction petitioner in certain circumstances, the 
court is only required to appoint counsel when a petitioner “alleges facts showing the possibility 
of a valid claim that would require further investigation on the defendant’s behalf.”  Swader v. 
State, 143 Idaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 
1112.  In determining whether the alleged facts justify the appointment of counsel, “every 
inference must run in the petitioner’s favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and 
cannot be expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts.”  Charboneau, 140 Idaho 
at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13.  However, where the claims in the petition are so patently 
frivolous that there is no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim, with or 
without counsel’s assistance, the court may deny the request for counsel and proceed with the 
usual procedure for dismissing the meritless post-conviction petition.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 
529, 164 P.3d at 809; Hust, 147 Idaho at 684, 214 P.3d at 670. 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure 
Act.  I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.  A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent 
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civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to 
relief.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 
662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).  Generally, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for 
post-conviction relief.  Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008).  
However, unlike other civil complaints, in post-conviction cases, the “application must contain 
much more than a short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under 
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1).”  Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)).  Instead, the 
application must be supported by a statement that “specifically set[s] forth the grounds upon 
which the application is based.”  Id. (citing I.C. § 19-4903).  “The application must present or be 
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject 
to dismissal.”  State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-
4903). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief on the trial court’s own initiative or in response to a party’s motion.  “To 
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence establishing a 
prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of 
proof.”  State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 
Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)).  Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal “if the applicant’s evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact” as to 
each element of the petitioner’s claims.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. 
§ 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.  While a court must accept a 
petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept either the 
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applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s 
conclusions of law.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 
Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)).  The trial court is not required to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition when the alleged facts, even if true, would 
not entitle the petitioner to relief.  Id. (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 
1220 (1990)).  “Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief 
when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not 
justify relief as a matter of law.”  Id. 
In his post-conviction petition, Snider claimed that he had discovered new evidence; that 
he was actually innocent, with the sub-claim that his speedy trial rights had been violated; that 
law enforcement had committed misconduct and illegal influence in his underlying case; and that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his defense or evidence and failing to 
suppress evidence.  (R., pp.5-6.)  Snider did not, however, present any evidence to support these 
claims.  (See Id.)  Moreover, neither his claim of actual innocence—that the methamphetamine 
actually belonged to his codefendant (see Aug., p.17)—nor his sub-claim of a violation of his 
speedy trial rights were the proper subject for post-conviction.  Snider’s claim of innocence was 
litigated at trial, and his speedy trial claim should have been raised on direct appeal and was 
therefore forfeited.  I.C. § 19-4901(b).  His claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were also 
nothing more than allegations; neither of those claims were supported with evidence of either 
deficient performance or even an assertion that Snider’s case would have turned out differently.  
On these grounds, the district court determined that Snider’s petition was frivolous.  (Aug., pp.3-
9.)  On that basis, it correctly denied Snider’s request to appoint post-conviction counsel and 
entered its notice of intent to dismiss the petition.  (Id.)   
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Snider responded to the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss and presented his 
alleged new evidence:  A response to a records request filed with the Whitman County, 
Washington, Clerk informing Snider that there had been no felony warrants issued for him for 
the period of May to August, 2011.  (Aug., p.25.)  As noted by the district court, this letter did 
not actually support Snider’s post-conviction claims.  In his underlying case, Snider was pulled 
over and arrested “[o]ne day in May” on an active warrant.  (See Aug., p.2.)  Snider claimed that 
the letter confirmed there were no active warrants for him in May, and so there was no basis for 
the stop.  (Aug., p.15.)  But, as the district court explained, the letter only covered the period 
from May through August; it did not show that there were no warrants issued prior to May, nor 
did it show that there were no warrants issued outside of Whitman County.  (R., pp.13-14.)  
Snider was not entitled to relief. 
Snider’s frivolous petition for post-conviction relief was correctly dismissed by the 
district court.  His several claims were either unsupported by the law, unsupported by the record, 
or waived.  Because Snider failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court also 
properly denied his motion for appointed counsel.  The district court’s order denying appointed 
counsel and dismissing Snider’s petition for post-conviction relief should be affirmed. 
 
--
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s judgment 
summarily dismissing Snider’s petition for post-conviction relief. 
 DATED this 8th day of November, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer_____________ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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